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We explore the determinants of the number of bank relations of listed Japanese firms in a
unique data set covering 1982-1999. Japanese firms had about 7 long-term and 8 short-
term bank loan relations on average. We present a statistical description of the bank
relations in terms of size, financing structure, ownership, and firm activity. We analyze
the determinants of the choice for the number of bank relations.  Larger firms have a
lower concentration of individual loan sets. Having a main bank relation also reduces the
number of bank relations, while debt-rich and cash-poor firms have more bank relations.
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In this paper we analyze in detail the number of banking relations Japanese listed firms
had in the last two decades. We focus especially on long-term loans in the period 1982-
1999 (with some results for short-term loans in the years 1998-1999). Contrary to earlier
studies on the optimal number of bank relationships (see  Detragiache ., 2000) we
exploit the time variation in our rather unique data set. Moreover, we are able to
distinguish differences between short-term and long-term borrowing decisions, which is
new in this field (compare  with Farinha and Santos, 2000). Since our study provides
new insights into Japanese borrowing decisions we present both descriptive statistics and
various econometric borrowing choice models.
Why is it interesting to analyze the long-term and short-term borrowing decisions for the
Japanese case? First, it is widely believed that especially long-term loans were essential
to enhance the rapid Japanese economic development in the 1970s and 1980s. The role of
the financial system in providing financial means for investment that generated the high
GDP growth rates has been crucial. As known, in post-war Japan long-term bank loans
were the number one source of external funds for almost all firms (see Fukuda, 2001).
Except for a few cash-rich firms internal financing was limited in general. As Ito (1992)
shows, internal financing in the 1960s and 1970s was about 20% of the total financial
needs (as compared to 50% for the U.S.) This is even true for firms within the business
groups (	), wherein banks play a well-known key position in providing external
finance. The dominant role of long-term loans in external finance is reflected in the fact
that until the mid-1980s bond financing was strictly regulated (even after 1985 only very
large firms were able to issue bonds). So private long-term loans formed the financial
core of the investment-led Japanese growth. It is good to illustrate that the major
providers of the long-term loans in the 1980s and 1990s were the three long-term credit
institutions, so-called city banks (about 10 on average in the last two decades), and for
smaller firms the about 120 local (or regional) banks. Secondly, the long-term loans are
also seen as the key to the current economic depression in Japan. The bad loan problem
has a serious impact on real economic activity since the beginning of the 1990s. When
3the bubble burst in 1990 the average quality of especially the long-term loans appeared
not to be as good as expected. Third, as explained above banks play a key role in the
Japanese industrial structures (keiretsu). Lending activity, combined with equity
ownership, is therefore relatively more important than in any other market economy.
The theoretical background of our paper is a key problem in financial economics: what is
the optimal number of creditors? These creditors can be holders of either public or private
claims. In this paper we analyze the private component, namely the number of bank
contacts per firm. Our goal is to get a deeper understanding of the motives of Japanese
firms to contact more than one bank or in some cases even more than 10 banks (and
about 6 as a median value). For other countries similar work has been carried out (see 
Ongena and Smith, 2000a, for an international comparative study on 20 countries). In a
separate paper Ongena and Smith (2000b) report an overview of studies for various
individual countries on this issue. They illustrate that for instance in Norway the number
of bank relations is very low (with a median of one), while for Italy median values of 11
relations are reported. Ongena and Smith (2000a) argue that firms in countries with stable
and unconcentrated banking systems maintain more banking relations, while firms in
countries with strong judicial systems and stronger creditor protections maintain fewer
relations. Volpin (2000) adds that countries with low shareholder protection allow for
higher private benefits of control and through that allow for more banking relations.
Horiuchi (1993, 1994) presents the most detailed descriptive analysis for the borrowing
decisions by Japanese firms up to now. Horiuchi (1993) reports for 1990 an average
number of bank relations for 126 firms with less than 300 employees of 3.4 and for 309
firms with more than 300 employees an average number of relations of 7.7. Horiuchi
(1994) reports for 1992 an average (and median) number of 3 relations for 364 firms
(including small firms with less than 10 employees). So indeed Japanese firms do have
multiple banking contacts on average and the question to be answered is why. In our
study we extend Horiuchi’s work by updating statistical evidence and presenting models
that explain the number of banking relations.
4For Japanese firms who belong to a keiretsu structure a strong and long-lasting relation
with the bank that belongs to the group seems to be natural. But having this line of credit
it might also been easier to attract more loans from other banks. It is known in the
literature that long-lasting relations with principle banks could lead to higher interest
rates to be paid by Japanese firms (see Kaplan and Minton, 1994). So firms might weight
the benefits of having one bank (and keep their information secret) or try to let banks bid
for the lowest interest rates. It might also be true that some firms want a portfolio of loan-
providers in order to reduce the risk of shortage of financial capital (see Section 2 for a
more extensive review of the theoretical literature).
The rather unique feature of our data is the time-series information for long-term loans:
1982-1999. Indeed this period covers the ’bubble’ and the post-’bubble’ years. One of the
items covered by us is the analysis of these two rather distinct periods. The idea behind
this analysis is that macroeconomic conditions might affect individual borrowing
decisions. On the other hand, loans are essential in explaining macroeconomic
fluctuations (the ‘credit view’). So it is natural to analyze the relation between
macroeconomic conditions and the number of banking contacts firms tend to have on
average. How is the macro bad loan problem affecting individual firm decisions to
contact banks? We illustrate this in Figure 1 that gives the percentage of single-bank
relations of 14055 firm-year observations for the years 1982-1999. Figure 1 suggests that
during an economic expansion firms tend to rely on a single relation, while in the period
of downturn the average percentage of multiple contracts seems to increase. So, current
profitability seems to limit the number of bank relations. Without giving a detailed
explanation here, this finding stresses the need for our analysis.
Insert Figure 1 about here
We proceed as follows. First we give a review of the theoretical and empirical literature
on the determination of the optimal number of bank relations. This literature is largely
based in the theory of corporate finance. In this literature one is interested in the game
between the provider of capital and the firm regarding the control rights that belong to the
5assets. This game can cover the choice between equity and debt, the rights of equity
holders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), or the composition of external financing (Bolton and
Scharfstein, 1996). We review the relevant literature and derive the variables that might
influence the choice of the number of bank contacts. Next we describe the data we use.
The data are provided by the Development Bank of Japan and form an unexplored rich
set of detailed balance sheet and profit-loss account data as well as indicators of
ownership of both (long-term) loans and equity. We give an extensive descriptive
overview of the variables of interest in Section 3. In Section 4 we shortly discuss two
main features of interest: the differences between ’bubble’ and post-’bubble’ borrowing
behavior and the short-term versus long-term borrowing decision. In Section 5 we
explore the data further. Since our main dependent variable, the number of bank relations,
is a discrete variable we estimate several types of discrete choice models. Moreover, we
present results for the explanation of the loan concentration ratio (measured by the








One of the most interesting fields in finance is the topic of coordination problems
between suppliers of capital. These problems hold with respect to owners of equity
(which lead to the governance problems like described by Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and
the suppliers of debt. Such coordination failures can be harmful and lead to takeover
failures (like the depositors in the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model) or renegotiation
problems (see Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). For debt it is natural to distinguish between
public debt (bonds) and credit. By definition, by selecting private credit the firms opts for
a higher concentration of claims (see Bris and Welch, 2001).
In this paper we add to the empirical literature on creditor concentration in a very specific
way: we focus on concentration of the most concentrated debt component: bank loans. So
we do not contribute to a large extent to the work on the choice between public and
private finance. Still, bank loan concentration is in itself an interesting phenomenon.
Across the globe it is widely observed that firms deal with more than one bank. Ongena
6and Smith (2000b) present an overview of studies of various countries and find a range of
the average number of banking relationships between 1.6 for small US firms in 1987 to
even 33.2 for Italian firms with a credit line over 500 billion Lira in 1993. Ongena and
Smith (2000a) observe that larger firms (as measured by sales) hold more bank relations,
but firms that do more foreign business typically have less domestic banking contacts.
Moreover, there seem to be cross-country financial system variables that are relevant to
explain national differences. Firms that reside in countries with poor creditor rights and
inefficient judicial systems typically have more banking relationships. If the banking
sector is lowly concentrated but stable and private bond markets are effective, the number
of relationships per firm is higher. These statistical observations demand an explanation.
Why would a firm operate via more than one bank? In this section we present an





The most intuitive explanation of single banking is based on cost minimization. To deal
with more than one bank is likely to be costly. First, transaction costs increase, because
both screening and monitoring costs are duplicated. It is more expensive to market debt
claims to multiple creditors (see Bris and Welch, 2001). These arguments are at the core
of the Diamond (1984) delegated monitoring model.  The Diamond model predicts a firm
to deal with a single bank that pools the costs of asymmetric information. A single bank
moreover avoids free-riding problems by private investors. So in all activities prior and
during the loan contract it would be cheaper to deal with a single bank. But also in ex
post cases, like in the case of bankruptcy, multiple relations will increase the costs of 
handling debt renegotiation (see Boot and Thakor, 1994, and Bolton and Scharfstein,
1996).
The second determinant of the number of banking relationships is competition on the
banking market. If competition is low and the banking market is dominated by a few
institutions it is likely that the number of banking relationships drops. On the other hand
if competition is fierce and a large number of competing banks fights for new loans firms,
7will try to benefit and increase the number of bank contacts. There is something more to
this. If the bank is not affected by heavy competition it might consider using the acquired
private corporate information to extract rents. Indeed, there is some evidence that the
longer the credit relation exists, the higher the costs of the credit line are (Kaplan, 1994).
Monopolistic rent extraction ex post might lead to a hold-up problem ex ante. Firms that
know that the bank might consider rent extraction might be reluctant to invest and to
apply for a loan. Another case of the holdup problem might also exist. In a competitive
banking environment a high-quality firm that tries to switch from its previous to a new
loan provider gets pooled with low-quality firms and might be forced to pay too high an
interest rate. This prevents a high-quality firm from increasing the number of banking
relationships.
How do these issues affect the desired quantity of banking relations of a firm? A firm that
faces a monopolistic banking industry might want to increase the number of contacts and
try to force banks to compete in making offers (see Von Thadden, 1994). This is true for
symmetrically informed banks. If we have the opposite case, an inside bank that
competes with outside banks, this might change. If outside banks start to compete, the
inside bank can use its knowledge on the quality of firms to select the good firms and
leaving the lemons as leftovers to the outside banks. This might lead to too high interest
rates and a reduction of the number of credit lines. So it is relevant to distinguish between
the nature of the existing firm-bank relationships. Petersen and Rajan (1995) give a final
argument to the competition issue. They argue that borrowing from banks with great
market power facilitates intertemporal sharing of the rent surplus and through that
stimulates a single banking relation.  Competition in credit markets hinders this process.
It might even be so that competition forces rents to the point where it is no longer in the
interest of any bank to lend to the firm. Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue that the
intertemporal rent sharing is especially crucial to smaller and younger firms.
A third class of arguments against the case of single banking relates to using multiple
contacts as insurance against liquidity or liquidation risk. The worst case for the firm is
that a profitable project has to be liquidated prematurely. Suppose that the loan includes a
8refinancing stage. If the relation bank cannot rollover their initial loan the firm in
liquidity need has to apply for loans from non-relation banks (arm’s-length financiers).
These banks probably think that the applying firms have ‘lemon’ projects (see also
Detragiache ., 2000).
A fourth class of arguments is formed by the ability among lenders to coordinate
activities. In a largely decentralized economy banks cannot commit to finance
unprofitable long-term projects because dispersed banks with limited capital will find it
costly to coordinate actions (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). A similar argument is put
forward by Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Bris and Welch (2001). In the Bolton-
Scharfstein-model the manager has an incentive to strategically default the project (
by diverting cash to herself). Coordinating with multiple lenders disciplines the manager.
On the other hand it might be the case that fewer creditors have more incentives to check
managers. Such creditors have an incentive to invest more in monitoring activity (see
Bris and Welch, 2001). Writing debt contracts with multiple lenders is costly though (see
the first class of arguments). In any case, a decrease of default risk will increase the
number of lenders. The same holds to the degree of synergy between the assets of the
firm (the degree to which the assets are worth more together than apart) or the liquidation
value.
Fifth, the type of business activity might affect the number of creditors. Take the example
of a highly innovative, high quality firm that invests to a large extent in R&D. If this firm
believes that it will be successful, it will not be willing to give all the information to
multiple financiers (see Yosha, 1995). Low-quality firms on the other hand might want to
contact multiple banks. Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998) analyze a model that
includes the competition on the output market for firms. The main point is again that
leakage of information is detrimental to a firm’s success on the output market. The firm
can avoid this in two ways. First, it decides on the amount of information given to
creditors, and second, it can change the number of contacts. If a firm gives more
information to a bank and its quality is high, it can get a lower interest rate. More
creditors again intensify competition. Highly rated firms optimally try to deal with many
9banks and will disclose as little information as they can. Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995)
stress the point that it might be optimal for a bank to inform competitors of the innovating
firm with respect to the new technology in order to avoid financial distress. Bolton and






The empirical literature on explaining the number of banking contacts is typically more
concentrated than its theoretical equivalent. In Table 1 we present an overview of the
results of five studies: Detragiache et al. (2000) for Italian firms, Farinha and Santos
(2000) for Portugese data, Ongena and Smith (2000a) for multiple countries, Degrijse and
Ongena (2001) for Norwegian firms, and Houston and James (2001) for U.S. firms. We
classify the determinants of single-banking relationships along the five theoretical classes
presented above (so a + in Table 1 is a positive stimulus for single banking). The
classification of variables is in some cases arbitrary, but illustrative for our purposes.
There is at least mixed evidence for the first class: cost minimization. The age of the firm
is only found to be important in the Portuguese case. The evidence on firm size is mixed.
With respect to the industrial organization of the banking market there seem to be clues
that a more concentrated banking market predicts single relations. Not all the studies
present results with a straightforward interpretation though. By far the most important
category is the class of liquidity/liquidation risk. Here we do find some evidence of its
relevance. The coordination problems seem to be less relevant. With respect to the
business activity there is not much hard statistical evidence to be favored. An important
characteristic is profitability. Degrijse and Ongena (2001), using data for  Norwegian
publicly listed firms for the period 1979-1995,.find a robust and economically relevant
negative two-way correspondence between the number of relationships and sales
profitability. They also find that firms replacing a single relationship are on average
smaller and younger than those firms choosing not to replace a single relationship.
10




The primary source of the data used is the  (FSD) and 	
 (SLD) of individual firms. Both sets are provided by the 
. The FSD includes more than 500 items in balance sheet accounts, profit
and loss accounts and cash flow statements. Moreover, the set contains other qualitative
information on stock ownership, like the names of the top-10 shareholders and their
holding share of equity. SLD indicates from which financial institution the firms attract
their long-term (1982-1999) and short-term loans (1998-1999)1. The FSD data covers
more than 2000 firms listed on the main Japanese stock markets (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya,
etc.) from 1957 onwards. The SLD data is, however, available only after 1982. We
combine consistently both sources and transform all available information into firm-year
observations.
We need to define our interpretation of a bank relation. We the total number of banks that
provided long-term loans in year as the number of long-term loans. For most of those
loans it will be likely that the relationship continues up to the next year, but we do not
check whether the same bank actually provides a long-term loan next year. So suppose
that a normal long-term loan will last for three years and a firm has two providers: bank
A grants the loan at , bank B at time  In our set we observe one bank contact at time
 2 at times  and   and only 1 at time  !. So we don’t measure the length of an
individual loan relation (which we of course could do with our data).
The total number of firm-year observations in the original dataset from 1982 to 1999 is
34939. In combining the two sets, however, some of the observations are excluded
mainly due to inconsistencies between the two data sets. For instance, the outstanding
long-term loans in the SLD data sometimes do not match the balance sheet registration of
                                                          
1
 Financial institutions include life- and non-life insurance companies as well as public
and private banks. Insurance companies too are main long-term funds suppliers in Japan.
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long-term loans in the FSD source. Also, the source of the long-term loans is in some
cases classified by miscellaneous financial institutions. In this case we cannot identify the
number of bank relations. This is also true for the case of classification as foreign banks;
that is to say, the data set does not indicate the specific name of the foreign bank.  Since
our main concern is the determinants of the number of bank relations, sample firms with
above characteristics are excluded from the analysis. As a result of this data screening,
we have 20740 firm-year observations in terms of unbalanced panel data from 1982 to
1999.2
We use the following symbols and variables to describe the data:
CBR = corporate bonds to total debt;
DAR = debt-to-assets ratio;
EMP = number of employees (in persons; in estimation models in thousand persons);
EXP = exports to sales ratio;
FTA = fixed tangible assets (billion yen);
GIR = gross investment rate (increase in fixed tangible assets excluding land /average of
fixed tangible asset at the beginning and the end of the period);
HIL = Herfindahl index for long-term loans;
HIS = Herfindahl index for short-term loans;
ICR = interest coverage ratio (profits before tax plus financial expense to financial
expense);
IRR = implicit interest rate (interest and discount paid including bonds /profit before tax);
LAR = liquid assets to total assets ratio;
LLR = long-term loans to total debt;
LND = land to assets ratio;
MBD = main-bank dummy variable = 1 if a bank supplies more than 40% of the loans
and is among the top 10 equity holders (see hereafter);
                                                          
2
 It should be noted, however, that the calendar year does not correspond to the actual
accounting period of the firm.  For example, the firm with the accounting period starting
12
NBL = number of long-term bank loans;
NBS = number of short-term bank loans;
ROA = return on assets (profits after tax / the average of the total asset at the beginning
and the end of period);
R&D = R&D expenditure to total sales;
SAL = total sales (billion yen);
SEQ = shareholder’s equity (billion yen);
SLR = short-term loans to total debt;
STP = average stock price (the average of maximum and minimum stock price during the
period, in yen);
TAS = total assets (billion yen, in 1995 constant prices in estimation models);
TBQ = average Tobin’s Q (debt + market value of shareholder’s equity)/(debt + book
value of shareholder’s equity). The market value of shareholders' equity is obtained by
multiplying the average stock price by the number of shares outstanding;
TDE = total debt (billion yen);
TSL = total short-term loans (billion yen);
TLL = total long-term loans (billion yen).
We checked whether our data reflect the industrial sector of the Japanese economy by
mapping our sample on the SNA-classification. Indeed we have a representative sample,
although listed firms have an overrepresentation in manufacturing (see Table A1 in
Appendix A). In this section we present a selective descriptive overview of the data. We
confine ourselves to the correlation coefficients between likely determinants of the
number of bank loans and the number of bank loans itself. First we refer to Appendix B
for a rather complete overview of the number of long-term loan bank relations across the
sample. The single bank relation is actually the most frequently observed number of
relations for the period of 1987 to 1991, which is referred to as the ‘Bubble Economy’.
                                                                                                                                                                            
in April 1998 and ending in March 1999 is classified as 1999 in spite that the firm




Table 2 presents the number of long-term bank relations over the sample period. We
show the time series of the number of banking relations for various cases. We
distinguish: no loans (0), a single loan (1), 2 to 4 loans, 5 to 7 loans, 8-10 loans, 11-15
loans, and over 15 loans. In the bottom line of Table 2 we give the percentage of single
loans (se also Figure 1). Table 2 shows that there is a general increase of the number of
loans over time. It also appears that especially the classes with multiple loans (over 10
loans) seem to increase above average.
Insert Table 2 about here
We also provide a figure of the mean and median number of long-term loan relations
(Figure 2). As can be seen from Figure 2 the average number of relations decreases from
7.74 in 1982 and it reaches it bottom level 6.65 in 1989. After 1990, it fluctuates around 7
except for the sharp decline in 1997. This means that the concentration of the long-term
loans has been gradually promoted towards the bubble period but recovered to the
original level with the collapse of the Bubble. As shown in Figure 2, however, the median
of the number of long-term bank relations is quite stable over the sample period. It
remains at 6 except for 1982, 1983, and 1993, where the median is 7.
Insert Figure 2 about here
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We also computed the Herfindahl index for long-term loans per firm (see Figure 3). The
average of this index increases from 0.370 in 1982 to its maximum of 0.409 in 1990. The
same tendency can be seen for the median value. The concentration, however, gradually
decreases towards its lowest level 0.335 in 1995 and increases again towards 1997.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Table 3 presents the number of bank relations by the so-called debt-financing pattern.
The main reason to give this information is that loans can be seen as substitutes of other
debt classes. We classified the sources of debt into 5 categories; (1) trade debt, (2) short-
term loans,  (3) long-term loans, (4) corporate bonds, and (5) other miscellaneous debt.
Accordingly, there are 31 (5"5+5"4+5"3+5"2+5"1+5"0) combinations of the above 5
funding categories. Table 3 indicates the actually observed combinations of the above 5
sources in our sample. The average number of relations for the patterns labeled 29 and 31
are similar as for the aggregated number, around 7 and 8 for average and 6 and 7 for
median, reflecting the fact that these patterns are the most frequently observed ones in
our sample. The numbers for the pattern 14 are considerably small, 2.17 for mean and 1
for the median value. Although the sample size is very small (23 firm-year observations),
it should be noted that this pattern does not use any other debt instrument except for the
miscellaneous class. Also, the number for the patterns 23 and 26 are relatively large, both
are well excess of 10. It is also to be noted that these patterns do not use the trade debt at
all as debt-financing instrument. On the contrary, the patters 20 and 27, both of which do
not use the short-term loan, the number of relations are relatively small, 4.51 and 4.75.
Insert Table 3 about here
Table 4 presents the number of bank relations by firm size, measured by the number of
employees (EMP), total assets (TAS), total sales (SAL), total debt (TDE), and total
amount of long-term loans (TLL). There is an apparent tendency in the number of bank
relations: that is to say, the number of relations increases as the firm size increases. This
15
increase is quite strong for the mean values but also apparent in de median values. Note
that we deflated all nominal indicators in to 1995 yen prices.
Insert Table 4 about here
In the review of the theory of the number of bank relations we argued that some financial
indicators might be of influence. In order to shed some descriptive statistical light on this
issue we select ten indicators from the financial statements of the firms we consider and
relate the profiles of these variables with our information on the number of bank
relations.
The first three variables (ROA, STP and TBQ) all relate to profitability. It seems that a
higher ROA and STP correlates with fewer loans. For Tobin’s Q we do not find a very
strong pattern, although a higher Tobin’s Q seems to correlate with the smaller loan
classes. The items 4 to 8 (DAR, IRR, LAR, LLR and ICR) relate to the financial structure
of the firm. A higher debt-to-assets ratio correlates with multiple loans. Single loans seem
to be a little more expensive. Firms with higher liquidity tend to have fewer loans. Firms
with a high interest coverage opt for fewer loans as well. Item 9 (GIR) describes the real
growth of the firm (which does not seem to affect the number of loan choice), while item
10 (LND)gives some information on the likely role of collateral. Firms with more land on
the balance sheet tend slightly to have more loans.
Insert Table 5 about here
It is also interesting to consider the variables representing the nature of the firm that seem
to affect the number of bank relations. Table 6 presents those variables by the number of
bank relations. In Table 6 variables listed in Columns (1) to (7) are those measuring the
scale and nature of firm’s activity. There is a distinct tendency in those variables: that is
to say, in spite of the systematic tendency across the firms with a number of bank
relations exceeding two, the firms with a single bank relation show values that are
apparent outliers of the above tendency. For all those variables firms with a single bank
16
relation show a larger value than firms with two to ten bank relations. There seems to be
a discontinuity between single and multiple bank relations. This tendency is also
conceived for the variables representing specific activity: Research and Development and
international activity (as measured by EXP).  Both activities are listed in Columns (8) and
(9). In columns (10) we present the relation between financial ownership of the firm and
the number of bank relations. If the number of banking contacts increases financial
institutions apparently also want to hold more equity. The relationship with financial
institutions through stock ownership is considerably tight for the large number of bank
relations.
Insert Table 6 about here
The Japanese industrial organization differs to a large extent from most western
equivalents. Mutual ownership of stock is quite common, especially in the group
structures (keiretsu). Within the group structure long-lived equity holdings and lender
relations are the key financial characteristics. As known, banks play a central role in these
business groups, so it is valuable to give some idea of the relation between simultaneous
holdings of loans and equity. Especially if we want to test the hypothesis that firms that
have a main bank do want fewer banking contacts. In order to consider the relationship
between loan activity and equity ownership, we classify our firm-year observations into
the following seven categories:
Case 1: if the largest equity owner is also the largest debt owner;
Case 2: if the largest equity owner resorts under the top-3 debt owners;
Case 3: if the largest equity owner resorts under the top-10 debt owners;
Case 4: if the largest debt owner resorts under the top-3 equity owners;
Case 5: if the largest debt owner resorts under the top-10 equity owners;
Case 6: if one of the top-3 equity owners resorts under the top-3 debt owners
Case 7: if one of the top-10 equity owners resorts under the top-10 debt owners
17
Table 7 presents the percentage of firms for the above seven cases in our sample by year.
As is expected, Case 1 is the most rare case, but it is a striking result that more than 5
percent of the firm-year observations fall into this class.  Although the equity ownership
by banks is highly restricted in Japan3, about half of the firm-years are classified in Case
6 and about 90 percent of the firm-year observations in our sample belong to Case 7. In
this context, Table 7 suggests the distinct group-feature of the Japanese firms. All the
figures show the increasing tendency over the sample period, indicating the tight
relationships between firms and banks. These variables will play an important role in the
econometric analysis in Section 4.
Insert Table 7 about here
"#' %	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Let us turn to the description of bank relations for short-term loans. The data for short-
term loan composition by individual firms is available only for 1998 and 1999. Table 8
gives the number of firm-year observations by the number of bank relations in short-term
loan. The number of consistently available firms is 1204 and 1211 respectively for 1998
and 1999. As a result the total number of firm-year observations is 2415, in which 71.6
percent of total observations are those using short-term loans as a debt-financing
instrument. The firms with a single bank relation, however, consist of 3.9 percent of the
total in 1998 and 4.5 percent in 1999. These are considerably lower than the
corresponding values of 9.9 percent and 8.5 percent for long-term loans. The
concentration of bank loans seems to be lower for short-term loans than for the long-term
loans.
Insert Table 8 about here
                                                          
3
 In Japan the maximum share of equity holding of a bank for one firm is restricted to 5
percent. It should be noted that in our data set the financial institution includes life-
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Table 9 also shows the corresponding statistics to those in Table 2 for long-term loans.
The exact number of bank relations for short-term loan is presented in the Appendix. As
can be seen from the tables, all figures suggest that concentration is lower for short-term
loans than for long-term loans. The average numbers of bank relations are 8.25 and 7.99
respectively for 1998 and 1999, while those for long-term loans are 7.22 and 7.38 for the
corresponding year. The average Herfindahl indices are 0.297 and 0.286, which are less
than the corresponding indices for long-term loan by about 0.07.





In Section 2 we review the wide field of theoretical work on the optimal number of
creditors. In Section 3 we discussed our data in some detail. Matching the theoretical
insights with the availability of the Japanese data we observe two items of interest in our
data that are not covered in large detail by theoretical models:
1. The typical Japanese feature of the bubble economy: how did this affect the
borrowing decisions?
2. What are the specific insights with respect to the decision regarding the number of
short-term and long-term financiers?
We do not intend to develop a complete new theoretical model that covers these two
elements here. Instead we sketch likely determinants of the differences.
With respect to the differences between the characteristics of the Japanese financial
system in the 1980s and the 1990s we note the following. First, profitability of firms
changed. Table A.3 in Appendix A shows the high ROA-values in the 1980s and the
lower profitability in the 1990s (the same holds for Tobin’s Q and the average stock
price). There is also a remarkable reduction in debt-to-assets and liquid-to-total assets
ratio. There are no a priori assumptions though that would trouble the relation between
                                                                                                                                                                            
insurance companies as well as private banking companies. The equities held by
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these variables and the number of bank loans. A variable that could lead to differences
between the 1980s and the 1990s is the corporate bonds to total debt variable. The
Japanese corporate bond market was not fully developed in the 1980s, but it is in the
1990s. So we expect that the borrowing decisions by firms will be affected stronger by
the corporate bond market indicator in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Another striking
difference between the 1980s and the 1990s is the growth rate of the firm (see Column
(9) in Table A.3) measure by investment. The Japanese economy invested more in R&D
in the 1980s (although this is hard to measure precisely, since Japanese firms tend to
report lower expenditure on R&D than actually purchased). The strong impetus to growth
by investing in R&D seriously changed in the 1990s, so we might expect to see some
differences between the borrowing decisions in the 1980s and 1990s due to R&D
expenditure shifts.
Next we focus on the demand for the number of short-term and long-term loans. Is there
any difference between those two: or in other words is the desired number of loans a
function of the maturity of the loans? What are the key-differences between short- and
long-term borrowing? First, applying for additional long-term funds is probably more
expensive. The firm needs to hand in another detailed long-term investment plan. The
lender will ask for collateral and try to monitor the firm during the years of the contract.
Secondly, the main advantage of a long-term loan though is that, once the firm obtains
the loan, it can pursue its investment policy for a number of years without the
disturbances and worries about anew loan application. Applying for another short-term
loan will be a little easier in general. This is mostly a kind of roll-over credit. So it is
likely that if profitability increases the firm will try to increase its number of long-term
loans if it wants to expand business. If the firm owns many liquid assets though it is
likely that those assets will be used first to finance investment, given the relatively higher
costs of long-term loans. So we expect positive impact of profitability and negative
impact of the liquid-to-total assets ratio on the number of long-term loans. For short-term
loans these relations will be less important given the relatively lower costs of one
additional short-term loan.
                                                                                                                                                                            








In Section 3 we presented descriptive statistics of our data. From this descriptive analysis
a general picture of the borrowing activity of Japanese listed firms emerges. We
summarize these findings as follows:
• On average Japanese listed firms have about 6-7 long-term and 8 short-term credit
relations. These numbers vary across industries;
• There is a time series pattern in loan concentration that coincides with the patterns of
a number of financial indicators, such as profitability (ROA), solvability (DAR), and
liquidity (LAR) indicators.
• Size of the firm, especially the financial size, seems to correlate with the number of
loans.
• There is a clue that stock ownership relations coincide with loan relations (especially
via the main-bank relation).
• It is likely that substitution between various liability categories determines the
number of bank relations.
• There seem to be differences between the choice for a single or multiple relation as
business activity is considered (R&D).
In this section we present behavioral models that describe the concentration of loans
more precisely. We can proceed in a number of ways from here. First, we can treat all
observations as true firm-year observations and take no account of the panel data nature.
This implies for instance that we don’t include lagged firm information to predict next
period’s firm decisions. Alternatively, we could treat the data as a true panel. We use the
former approach and analyze firm-year decisions. We can motivate this by decomposing
the total observed variance into inter-firm and temporal variance. For the long-term loans
we can perform such an analysis. In Table 10 we present our global analysis of variance.
Since the data used in this study is a typical unbalanced panel, some firms have relatively
small number of observations across the sample period. Sometimes firms have only one
observation. Including these firms with such a short sample period in to the analysis of
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variance will lead to underestimation of the inter-year variation. Accordingly, we exclude
the firms with less than 11 available observations, which amounts to 2/3 of the total
sample period of 18 (1982 to 1999). As a result, the number of observations utilized for
the analysis is 7602 out of the total of 14055 firm-year observations. Table 10 shows that
we need to reject the hypothesis that either cross-section or time variance dominates the
observations. It is clear though that the cross-section variance is typically larger than the
year-variance. For short-term loans, since we have only a 2-year panel, we typically
cannot perform an equivalent analysis.
Insert Table 10 about here
So we use firm-year observations in all our models. Given the time-series nature of our
data for long-term loans, and the macroeconomic pattern found, we use various sub-
samples in our estimation. In all models we show the results for the following cases:
1. Long-term loans in 1982-1999;
2. Long-term loans in 1982-1989 (the ‘bubble’ period);
3. Long-term loans in 1990-1999 (the post-‘bubble’ period);
4. Long-term loans in 1998-1999 (in order to compare with the next class);
5. Short-term loans in 1998-1999.
The first class uses all the data available for long-term loans. The next three give relevant
sub-samples, so we can treat the time series nature of the data. The fourth class for long-
term loans is modeled in order to compare with the shorter sample for short-term loans.
For these data classes we estimate three basic models:
• A logit-model that explains the choice between single (Y=1) versus multiple (Y=0)
relations;
• A multinomial logit-model that explains the choice for the various number of loan
classes (single, 2-4, 5-7, 8-10, 11-15, and over 15);
• A tobit-model that explains the Herfindahl-index.
What are the key determinants of the borrowing decisions we model? Here we use the
same classes of indicators that are presented in the literature to explain multiple lending.
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Since we are not able to observe all the variables we described in Section 2 we present
the different variables here in a nutshell:
1. Variables that indicate the size of the firm: number of employees (EMP), total assets
(TAS), total sales (SAL), and total debt (TDE), and total long-term loan amount
(TLL) (the last four deflated by the GDP deflator);
2. A variables that indicates profitability (ROA). Here we note that in all our results
Tobin’s Q (TBQ) does not play a significant role;
3. A variable that indicates solvability (debt-to-assets ratio, DAR);
4. A variables that indicates liquidity (liquid-to-total assets, LAR);
5. Variables that indicate alternative financing forms. We use the corporate bonds to
debt ratio (CBR) for all models, the long-term loan to debt ratio (LLR) for the short-
term loan equations, and the short-term loan to debt ratio (SLR) for the long-term
loan equations;
6. A variable that indicates the R&D activity of the firm: R&D expense to total sales.
Moreover, we include industry dummies (not reported) and year dummies (not
reported).
7. A variable that indicates a main-bank relation (MBD). We define MBD as a dummy
variable, which equals 1 if one bank supplies more than 40 % of the loans to the firm
and belongs to the top-10 shareholders.
First we present a logit-model of the decision to have either a single loan, represented by
Y=1, or to have multiple loans (Y=0). The results are presented in Table 11. In Table 11
we give five panels (A to E) that describe the various sub-samples for long-term and
short-term loan decisions. The rows in each panel give the results for the five size
indicators as listed above. The columns give the various estimated parameters of the
determinants (see also above). In the last column we give the Kullback-Leibler R-squared
and the Correct Prediction Rate (CPR). The numbers of observations used in each sub-
sample are denoted at the top of each panel. At the bottom of each panel we also provide
the marginal derivatives of the determinants x on the probability of a single relation P:
dP/dx, since we cannot attach an economic interpretation to the coefficients estimated.
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We shade the significant estimated parameters (t-values between brackets below the
estimated parameters).
Insert Table 11 about here
From Table 11 a general picture emerges. In all models we find that:
• A higher debt-to-assets ratio DAR increases the probability of  multiple loans;
• A higher liquid-to-total assets LAR increases the probability of a single loan;
• A higher corporate bond to total debt ratio increases the probability of a single loan;
• Having a main bank relation increases the probability of a single relation.
These results are in line with most theoretical insights. Apparently the solvability and
liquidity of firms affect the number of loans the firms maintains. If a firm has relatively
better access to public markets (more corporate bonds) apparently wants less banking
contacts. Apart from the main bank firms want to reduce the number of bank relations.
Besides these rather standard findings we observe for the size of the firm the following.
There is no strong overall finding for size. We do find that the total size of loans (TLL)
has a positive impact on the number of bank relations. But in Panel B (1982-1989) there
are indications that bigger firms intended to opt for single relations in the bubble period.
With respect to profitability there is an interesting finding in Panels D and E. An increase
in ROA leads to multiple long-term relations, but to a higher probability of a single short-
term bank relation. Note that we can only conclude this from our short samples (1998-
1999)4. Finally if we compare the results for R&D we tend to find some evidence for an
increase in multiple loan contacts with respect to long-term loans in the bubble period,
but no significant impact thereafter. The Kullback-Leiber R-squared varies from about
0.1 to 0.3, but the correct prediction rate is around 90 percent for all the models. The fit
of the model with total long-term loans (TLL) as an indicator of size is by far better than
the fit of the other models. In the following tables we therefore use this indicator as proxy
for the size of the firm.
                                                          
4
 We do not find any impact of Tobin’s Q in all our models estimated.
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In the next step we analyze the decision of multiple loan contacts a little further (see for a
similar approach Detragiache ., 2000). We model 6 classes:
1.  a single relationship;
2.  2-4 relationships;
3.  5-7 relationships;
4.  8-10 relationships;
5.  11-15 relationships;
6.  16 and more relationships.
Table 12 contains the results of the estimated multinomial logit model. We again use the
same structure as presented in Table 11. Note that we use TLL (total long-term loans) as
size indicator. For each panel we present the estimated parameters and the dP/dx values.
In estimating the model, the parameters for the Y=1 case (a single relation) are
normalized to zero. So all parameters should be interpreted as being the differences from
the base case: Y=1. Again, the parameters as such do not have any economic
interpretation, so we again give the dP/dx values. In the last section of each panel we give
in the last column the fraction of observations that fall into the relevant class.
Insert Table 12 about here
First we present our general findings of Table 12:
• We observe different results for the classes with relatively few loan contacts (see less
than 8 loans) compared to the multiple loan contact cases;
• For size (TLL) we find that firms with no more than 4 loan contacts seem to opt for
fewer loan contacts, while firms with multiple loans try to increase this number. For
short-term loans the critical value of the number of loans is somewhat higher (10);
• Again for profitability we find that more profitable firms in the post-bubble period
wanted more long-term loans (especially for the high loan classes) and fewer short-
term loans;
• For debt-to-assets we find that a higher DAR decreases the number of loans for the
low classes (up to 8), but increases the number of loans above the critical value;
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• For liquid assets we find that cash-rich firms tend to reduce the number of long-term
loan contacts, especially for the higher loan classes. For short-term loans we find no
impact;
• Alternative financing forms (corporate bonds, and short for long-term loans and vice
versa) significantly influence the number of creditors. Especially for the average
number of loans there seems to be a negative impact of existing access to the
corporate bond market on the multiple bank-decision;
• For R&D we find modest results. In general it seems that R&D-intensive firms prefer
multiple loans (apart from the firms with 11-15 long-term loans in 1998-1999);
• For the main-bank relation we find an interesting result. Firms with a main bank
relation show to prefer to have a few more relations, but no more than 8 at the
maximum.
So the main differences between long-term borrowing in the 1980s and the 1990s relate
to the impact of profitability (more loans in the 1990s) and R&D (more multiple loans in
the 1980s. With respect to the difference between short-term and long-term loans we find
a confirmation of the logit model (Table 11) with respect to the impact of profitability
ROA) and liquidity (LAR), especially for the higher number of loans classes.
The previous results relate to the discrete lending choice. Next we use a continuous
variable as a dependent variable: the Herfindahl-index. This variable is limited in range
(by definition in the interval [0,1]). Prior to estimating the model we transformed the
original index by taking the logarithm and multiplying it by -1. By this transformation the
dependent variable lost its upper bound. After this transformation we apply an ordinary
Tobit model with a lower truncation at zero. Table 13 gives the estimation results. It
should be noted a larger value of the dependent variable implies a lower concentration
(multiple loan contacts). A plus sign in the table therefore indicates that an increase of the
determining variable will lead to more banking relations. Table 13 includes the same
panels and determinants as before. We again use the five indicators of size.
Insert Table 13 about here
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The results in Table 13 lead to the following conclusions:
• An increase in size leads to a lower concentration of loans.
• Higher profitability leads to multiple banking contacts for long-term loans. For short-
term loans we don’t find any impact;
• A higher debt-to-assets and a lower liquidity lead to more banking relations (apart
from LAR for short-term loans);
• A main-bank relation leads to a higher concentration (fewer loan contacts).
These results support the general findings of Table 11. With respect to the role of
corporate bonds we find a substitution effect with the number of loans in the 1990s (and
not in the 1980s). We find some support for complementarity between the total amount of
short-term loans and the number of long-term loans in the 1980s and substitution between




In this paper we analyze the number of bank relations that Japanese listed firms hold. For
long-term loans Japanese firms have about 6 relations (median value), while for short-
term loans this number is even higher. Compared to other countries this is about the
average value observed. We present an overview of the rather extensive literature in the
field of the optimal number of creditors. From this literature we retrieve a set of likely
candidate variables that might have an impact on the number of bank relations. We
analyze both short-term and long-term loans. Our main attention is focused on long-term
loans, since these loans are crucial in the functioning of the Japanese economy.
Moreover, our data have more information on the long-term loans (1982-1999) than we
have for the short-term loans (1998-1999). Next we present a detailed descriptive
analysis of our data. We cross-analyze various classes of variables, like size, profitability,
solvability, liquidity, nature, and ownership of the firm with their borrowing relations.
After that we turn to more behavioral explanations of the number of banking relations.
We estimate discrete choice models of the decision for single versus multiple relations,
the decision to have a number of bank relations in certain classes (in a multinomial logit
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model) and a model with a continuous measurement of the loan concentration (as
measured by the Herfindahl index).
Our general conclusions are as follows. The ’number of bank relations’ decision is
influenced by size of the firm, profitability, solvability and liquidity of the firm, and the
existence of a main bank relation. Apart from these general determinants we find some
evidence for a significant role of alternative financing forms (e.g. corporate bonds), and
an indicator of the activities of the firm with respect to R&D. We also find some support
for differences between the borrowing activity in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1980s the
Japanese corporate bond market was not well developed and did not provide an
alternative financing form. Moreover, R&D-intensive firms tended to want more bank
relations in the bubble period, but not thereafter. Concerning the differences between
short- and long-term borrowing we find that especially profitability and liquidity tend to
influence the number of long-term financing contacts.
Concluding, we find in general support for the mainstream of the existing literature on
the optimal number of creditors for the Japanese listed firms. We add some newer
insights with respect to the dynamic development of the number of loan contacts and the
differences between short- and long-term loan activity. Many alternative variables and
ideas could be included though from here. A natural candidate to include will be the
relative size of the corresponding bank. Via this variable we can model the
competitiveness of the loan supply better. Another variable to be implemented is the age
of the firm. Age of the firm is a variable that could measure ex ante informational
problems. We also plan to pay more attention to the role of collateral.
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Table 1 - Overview of empirical results on single-bank relationships
Class of explanation/variable DGG FS OS DO HJ
1 Cost minimalization
Firm size + - - -
Firm age 0 + - 0
Share of defaulted loans recovered +
Nonperforming loans 0
2 Competition on the banking market




Profitability + - -
Coverage ratio +
4 Coordination problems
Firm leverage + - -
Share of first owner 0






Variability of asset returns 0
Home sales -
Worldwide sales +
DGG = Detriagiache, Garella, Guiso (2000)
FS = Farinha, Santos (2000)
OS  = Ongena, Smith (2000a)
DO = Degrijse, Ongena (2001)
HJ = Houston, James (2001)
+ = significant determinant in explaining a choice for a single banking
relation;
0 = insignificant determinant;
- = significant determinant in explaining a choice for multiple banking.
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Table 2. Number of bank relations with respect to long-term loans by year
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 total
0 158 200 235 258 283 315 355 391 406 404 409 404 416 446 479 502 516 508 6685
1 49 59 59 66 70 82 86 90 96 93 69 62 69 65 69 94 103 89 1370
2≤≤4 142 140 154 158 155 149 149 172 187 191 192 207 189 213 220 260 254 244 3376
5≤≤7 162 176 159 160 188 179 184 184 189 202 204 187 207 222 230 236 272 286 3627
8≤≤10 117 126 148 144 138 140 126 146 153 159 156 165 140 157 170 168 187 195 2735
11≤≤15 104 90 87 106 89 96 88 85 94 103 111 126 142 143 134 126 138 157 2019
16≤ 47 49 48 43 48 44 42 35 42 51 50 57 54 56 54 49 84 75 928
total 779 840 890 935 971 1005 1030 1103 1167 1203 1191 1208 1217 1302 1356 1435 1554 1554 20740
with long-term
loans 621 640 655 677 688 690 675 712 761 799 782 804 801 856 877 933 1038 1046 14055
(percentage) (79,7) (76,2) (73,6) (72,4) (70,9) (68,7) (65,5) (64,6) (65,2) (66,4) (65,7) (66,6) (65,8) (65,7) (64,7) (65,0) (66,8) (67,3) (67,8)
percentage single
relation 7,9 9,2 9,0 9,7 10,2 11,9 12,7 12,6 12,6 11,6 8,8 7,7 8,6 7,6 7,9 10,1 9,9 8,5 9,7
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Table 3. Number of bank relations with respect to
 long-term loans by debt financing pattern
(1) (2)
T S L B M mean median
  ❍ 2.17 1
 ❍  ❍ 4.51 3
 ❍  ❍ 11.51 11
 ❍  ❍ ❍ 12.92 13
 ❍  ❍ ❍ 4.75 4
 ❍ ❍  ❍ 6.90 6








Table 4. Number of bank relations with respect to long-term loans by firm size
(1) (2)
# of obs. mean Median
-300 2574 5.48 5
300-600 3480 6.32 6
EMP 600-900 2592 6.96 6
(persons) 900-1500 2540 8.06 7
1500-3000 1873 8.72 9
3000- 996 9.70 8
-10 1832 4.97 5
10-20 2802 6.02 6
TAS 20-30 2175 6.36 6
(billion yen) 30-50 2735 7.42 7
50-100 2644 8.31 8
100- 1867 9.91 9
-10 1864 5.46 5
10-20 2760 6.08 6
SAL 20-30 2017 6.62 6
(billion yen) 30-50 2587 7.34 7
50-100 2769 8.27 7
100- 2058 8.95 8
-5 1334 4.14 4
5-10 2607 5.49 5
TDE 10-20 3300 6.42 6
(billion yen) 20-30 2009 7.39 7
30-50 2242 8.58 8
50- 2563 9.95 9
-0.25 1729 2.24 2
0.25-0.75 2369 4.26 4
TLL 0.75-1.50 2287 5.86 6
(billion yen) 1.50-3.00 2623 7.24 7
3.00-7.50 2923 9.08 9
7.50- 2124 13.12 12
total 14055 7.16 6
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Table 5. Selected financial indicators by number of bank relations (long-term loans)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(mean) ROA STP TBQ DAR IRR LAR LLR ICR GIR LND
1 2.26 2.173 1.63 55.99 8.51 64.88 3.52 18.04 40.37 6.81
2≤≤4 1.84 1.114 1.75 58.79 5.32 62.24 8.57 9.93 40.82 7.23
5≤≤7 1.29 928 1.55 63.62 5.10 59.79 15.51 5.42 38.33 7.45
8≤≤10 1.38 958 1.52 68.15 5.22 57.68 19.08 4.97 40.17 8.27
11≤≤15 1.06 901 1.47 70.26 5.22 56.18 21.63 3.83 38.02 7.59
16≤ 0.73 910 1.47 73.84 5.23 49.90 26.22 3.38 37.82 8.77
total 1.46 1.095 1.58 64.23 5.54 59.29 14.96 7.28 39.41 7.60
(median)
1 2.43 787 1.43 55.61 4.72 67.30 1.17 6.30 31.98 5.34
2≤≤4 1.98 717 1.38 58.78 4.74 64.05 5.12 4.63 31.44 5.36
5≤≤7 1.52 620 1.38 64.13 4.83 61.91 11.47 3.37 30.31 5.40
8≤≤10 1.43 619 1.38 69.68 5.10 59.98 16.05 3.12 31.51 6.17
11≤≤15 1.13 612 1.32 70.39 5.01 57.72 18.29 2.67 31.54 5.53
16≤ 0.93 637 1.31 75.67 5.13 50.27 23.93 2.52 30.86 6.09
total 1.55 655 1.37 65.09 4.90 61.29 10.58 3.47 31.16 5.59
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Table 6. Some other important indicators by number of bank relations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(mean) EMP TAS TDE SEQ SAL FTA CFL R&D EXP SHF
1 1.181 52.443 29.021 23.422 64.005 7.590 3.899 0.59 7.18 26.10
2≤≤4 934 44.586 26.050 18.536 50.742 7.436 3.089 0.70 7.35 24.38
5≤≤7 1.021 44.550 27.686 16.864 48.724 8.189 2.909 0.61 6.99 26.13
8≤≤10 1.923 82.775 57.020 25.755 85.234 18.850 4.965 0.65 6.98 31.79
11≤≤15 2.334 189.410 139.905 49.505 177.540 39.930 7.578 0.64 4.29 35.95
16≤ 6.836 1.053.455 870.523 182.932 532.349 739.870 84.418 0.29 0.00 31.45
total 1.259 57.613 36.887 20.726 62.135 11.296 3.652 0.64 7.04 27.26
(median)
1 585 27.423 14.604 10.998 30.249 3.302 1.808 0.00 0.00 24.18
2≤≤4 551 22.994 12.011 9.052 24.450 3.256 1.467 0.00 0.00 22.70
5≤≤7 621 24.203 14.347 8.200 24.361 3.788 1.355 0.00 0.00 24.30
8≤≤10 725 27.320 18.024 8.003 29.176 5.063 1.646 0.00 0.00 25.68
11≤≤15 994 45.882 30.812 13.037 46.556 7.920 2.301 0.00 0.00 32.02
16≤ 1.395 74.375 51.744 21.924 69.250 16.502 3.605 0.00 0.00 36.42
total 694 29.439 17.998 9.627 30.408 4.644 1.695 0.00 0.00 25.98
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Table 7. The relationship between stockholders and debt suppliers






































1982 4.83 8.86 14.33 23.99 56.36 40.74 83.90 100.00
1983 4.22 8.28 12.81 25.16 57.03 42.34 84.22 100.00
1984 5.19 10.08 14.05 25.95 59.24 43.97 85.34 100.00
1985 4.73 10.19 13.59 26.29 59.97 43.87 84.93 100.00
1986 4.65 8.72 12.21 26.45 61.63 44.77 85.61 100.00
1987 4.78 9.28 12.61 28.41 63.77 45.36 87.25 100.00
1988 4.59 8.74 12.30 25.93 63.41 42.96 86.52 100.00
1989 5.06 9.13 13.20 30.76 66.57 46.63 87.36 100.00
1990 4.99 10.38 14.45 31.27 64.78 46.78 87.78 100.00
1991 4.88 10.01 14.02 31.79 63.70 46.56 87.23 100.00
1992 3.58 10.23 14.58 31.84 64.45 49.10 88.87 100.00
1993 5.22 12.19 16.67 34.95 68.28 51.99 90.17 100.00
1994 4.49 10.99 15.61 35.21 69.91 50.81 90.76 100.00
1995 5.84 11.68 16.71 32.71 68.69 48.95 90.42 100.00
1996 5.02 11.63 15.28 33.30 72.63 48.69 89.85 100.00
1997 5.47 10.83 14.68 34.30 72.45 49.30 88.96 100.00
1998 5.78 10.50 14.35 35.45 72.93 47.69 89.88 100.00
1999 5.83 11.09 14.91 36.81 72.75 49.14 89.39 100.00
total 5.01 10.27 14.35 31.16 66.23 46.99 87.96 100.00
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Table 8. Number of bank relations with respect to short-term loans by year
1998 1999 total
0 481 476 957
1 47 54 101
2≤≤4 222 220 442
5≤≤7 345 368 713
8≤≤10 296 293 589
11≤≤15 203 197 400
16≤ 91 79 170
Total 1685 1687 3372
with short-term loans 1204 1211 2415
(percentage) 71.5 71.8 71.6
Percentage of single short-term relations 3.9 4.5 4.2
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1998 median 7 0,2220
mean 7.99 0,2862
1999 median 7 0,2260
mean 8.12 0,2826
total median 7 0,2239
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inter-firm 104194.4 509 204.7 34.9
inter-year 1187.2 17 69.8 11.9
error 41469.2 7075 5.9
total 146509.2 7601
44
Table 11 Estimation results for the binary logit model
for the single (Y=1) and multiple relations (Y=0)
Panel A: Long-term loans 1982-1999 N=13853 (Y=1: 1370; Y=0: 12483)
Estimates
constant Scale ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D MBD R2/CPR
(1) EMP -3.0365 0.0033 -0.0080 -0.0414 0.0358 0.0166 -0.0012 -0.0966 0.5247 0.1032
-(5.27) (0.26) -(0.89) -(19.62) (14.72) (8.12) -(0.53) -(4.26) (8.56) 0.9013
(2) TAS -3.0192 -0.0006 -0.0076 -0.0411 0.0358 0.0173 -0.0015 -0.0924 0.5124 0.1035
-(5.24) -(1.48) -(0.86) -(19.50) (14.72) (8.35) -(0.65) -(4.07) (8.34) 0.9012
(3) SAL -3.0313 0.0003 -0.0083 -0.0417 0.0358 0.0165 -0.0010 -0.0980 0.5303 0.1034
-(5.26) (1.44) -(0.93) -(19.66) (14.74) (8.08) -(0.41) -(4.32) (8.65) 0.9014
(4) TDE -3.0570 -0.0013 -0.0076 -0.0404 0.0358 0.0175 -0.0016 -0.0914 0.5079 0.1031
-(5.30) -(2.06) -(0.85) -(18.81) (14.73) (8.47) -(0.70) -(4.03) (8.26) 0.9012
(5) TLL -1.0550 -1.2119 -0.0154 -0.0151 0.0118 0.0154 -0.0068 -0.0238 0.3395 0.2563
-(1.74) -(23.53) -(1.87) -(6.60) (4.55) (7.15) -(2.91) -(1.01) (5.24) 0.9034
DP/dx
(6) EMP -0.2501 0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0034 0.0030 0.0014 -0.0001 -0.0080 0.0432
(7) TAS -0.2486 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0034 0.0029 0.0014 -0.0001 -0.0076 0.0422
(8) SAL -0.2497 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0034 0.0029 0.0014 -0.0001 -0.0081 0.0437
(9) TDE -0.2517 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0033 0.0029 0.0014 -0.0001 -0.0075 0.0418
(10) TLL -0.0778 -0.0893 -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0009 0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0018 0.0250
Panel B: Long-term loans 1982-1989 N=5262 (Y=1: 561; Y=0: 4701)
Estimates
constant Scale ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D MBD R2/CPR
(1) EMP -1.3270 0.0429 0.0009 -0.0508 0.0381 0.0094 -0.0051 -0.1855 0.2674 0.1322
-(3.44) (2.36) (0.06) -(14.05) (8.90) (2.34) -(1.34) -(4.77) (2.64) 0.8938
(2) TAS -1.2720 0.0008 0.0009 -0.0505 0.0372 0.0092 -0.0055 -0.1824 0.2654 0.1315
-(3.31) (1.33) (0.06) -(14.01) (8.77) (2.27) -(1.46) -(4.68) (2.61) 0.8941
(3) SAL -1.2822 0.0007 0.0010 -0.0510 0.0372 0.0097 -0.0049 -0.1816 0.2684 0.1325
-(3.33) (2.40) (0.07) -(14.09) (8.75) (2.42) -(1.31) -(4.69) (2.65) 0.8934
(4) TDE -1.2415 0.0011 0.0010 -0.0508 0.0372 0.0095 -0.0055 -0.1802 0.2639 0.1314
-(3.23) (1.23) (0.07) -(13.95) (8.76) (2.36) -(1.47) -(4.65) (2.60) 0.8938
(5) TLL -0.0084 -1.6352 -0.0099 -0.0213 0.0090 0.0142 -0.0094 -0.0696 0.1219 0.2878
-(0.02) -(15.14) -(0.66) -(5.27) (1.95) (3.29) -(2.45) -(1.71) (1.12) 0.8987
dP/dx
(6) EMP -0.1132 0.0037 0.0001 -0.0043 0.0032 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0158 0.0228
(7) TAS -0.1086 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0043 0.0032 0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0156 0.0227
(8) SAL -0.1093 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0044 0.0032 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0155 0.0229
(9) TDE -0.1060 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0043 0.0032 0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0154 0.0225
(10) TLL -0.0006 -0.1228 -0.0007 -0.0016 0.0007 0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0052 0.0092
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Table 11 (cont.)   Estimation results for the binary logit model
for the single (Y=1) and multiple relations (Y=0)
Panel C: Long-term loans 1990-1999 N=8564 (Y=1: 809; Y=0: 7755)
Estimates
constant scale ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D MBD R2/CPR
(1) EMP -2.6208 -0.0210 -0.0151 -0.0360 0.0360 0.0189 0.0007 -0.0504 0.6852 0.0982
-(4.49) -(1.00) -(1.46) -(13.62) (11.99) (7.77) (0.25) -(1.80) (8.74) 0.9065
(2) TAS -2.5972 -0.0011 -0.0150 -0.0356 0.0362 0.0197 0.0005 -0.0462 0.6689 0.0991
-(4.44) -(2.20) -(1.45) -(13.47) (12.04) (8.00) (0.18) -(1.65) (8.50) 0.9058
(3) SAL -2.6352 0.0000 -0.0154 -0.0362 0.0363 0.0186 0.0009 -0.0526 0.6937 0.0980
-(4.51) -(0.05) -(1.49) -(13.55) (12.07) (7.66) (0.31) -(1.88) (8.86) 0.9065
(4) TDE -2.6724 -0.0030 -0.0150 -0.0339 0.0362 0.0202 0.0003 -0.0437 0.6572 0.1004
-(4.57) -(3.11) -(1.45) -(12.48) (12.05) (8.22) (0.09) -(1.57) (8.36) 0.9059
(5) TLL -0.9930 -1.0435 -0.0188 -0.0102 0.0131 0.0153 -0.0055 0.0059 0.4833 0.2497
-(1.58) -(18.09) -(2.06) -(3.60) (4.10) (6.04) -(1.84) (0.20) (5.87) 0.9074
DP/dx
(6) EMP -0.2085 -0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0029 0.0029 0.0015 0.0001 -0.0040 0.0545
(7) TAS -0.2065 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0028 0.0029 0.0016 0.0000 -0.0037 0.0532
(8) SAL -0.2097 0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0029 0.0029 0.0015 0.0001 -0.0042 0.0552
(9) TDE -0.2123 -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0027 0.0029 0.0016 0.0000 -0.0035 0.0522
(10) TLL -0.0711 -0.0747 -0.0013 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0011 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0346
Panel D: Long-term loans 1998-1999 N=2036 (Y=1: 192; Y=0: 1844)
Estimates
constant scale ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D MBD R2/CPR
(1) EMP -2.2159 -0.0883 -0.0500 -0.0334 0.0383 0.0206 0.0011 0.0387 0.5391 0.1018
-(4.61) -(1.31) -(3.60) -(6.21) (6.50) (3.87) (0.19) (0.81) (3.29) 0.9072
(2) TAS -2.2398 -0.0013 -0.0503 -0.0333 0.0384 0.0211 0.0012 0.0395 0.5414 0.1017
-(4.69) -(1.39) -(3.63) -(6.17) (6.52) (3.90) (0.21) (0.82) (3.30) 0.9072
(3) SAL -2.2859 -0.0006 -0.0499 -0.0333 0.0387 0.0198 0.0013 0.0335 0.5582 0.1004
-(4.80) -(0.87) -(3.59) -(6.14) (6.57) (3.73) (0.23) (0.71) (3.42) 0.9072
(4) TDE -2.3050 -0.0035 -0.0502 -0.0313 0.0384 0.0218 0.0009 0.0406 0.5273 0.1036
-(4.84) -(1.85) -(3.62) -(5.69) (6.51) (4.03) (0.15) (0.85) (3.21) 0.9067
(5) TLL -0.4193 -1.2083 -0.0373 -0.0039 0.0114 0.0136 -0.0092 0.0921 0.2390 0.3046
-(0.80) -(9.55) -(2.69) -(0.68) (1.80) (2.35) -(1.61) (1.66) (1.36) 0.9096
dP/dx
(6) EMP -0.1756 -0.0070 -0.0040 -0.0027 0.0030 0.0016 0.0001 0.0031 0.0427
(7) TAS -0.1776 -0.0001 -0.0040 -0.0026 0.0030 0.0017 0.0001 0.0031 0.0429
(8) SAL -0.1814 0.0000 -0.0040 -0.0026 0.0031 0.0016 0.0001 0.0027 0.0443
(9) TDE -0.1825 -0.0003 -0.0040 -0.0025 0.0030 0.0017 0.0001 0.0032 0.0418
(10) TLL -0.0283 -0.0816 -0.0025 -0.0003 0.0008 0.0009 -0.0006 0.0062 0.0161
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Table 11 (cont.)   Estimation results for the binary logit model
for the single (Y=1) and multiple relations (Y=0)
Panel E: Short-term loans 1998-1999 N=2293 (Y=1: 101; Y=0: 2192)
Estimates
constant scale ROA DAR LAR CBR LLR R&D MBD R2/CPR
(1) EMP -1.3176 -0.0143 0.0529 -0.0328 -0.0050 0.0271 0.0088 -0.1288 1.9175 0.1982
-(1.29) -(0.44) (2.19) -(4.61) -(0.66) (3.86) (1.14) -(1.49) (8.16) 0.9564
(2) TAS -1.3588 0.0003 0.0521 -0.0339 -0.0046 0.0261 0.0099 -0.1399 1.9562 0.1989
-(1.32) (0.96) (2.16) -(4.72) -(0.60) (3.68) (1.28) -(1.61) (8.23) 0.9568
(3) SAL -1.3706 0.0006 0.0512 -0.0343 -0.0044 0.0262 0.0106 -0.1422 1.9570 0.1995
-(1.34) (1.26) (2.12) -(4.76) -(0.58) (3.72) (1.36) -(1.63) (8.26) 0.9568
(4) TDE -1.3323 0.0003 0.0524 -0.0337 -0.0048 0.0264 0.0096 -0.1348 1.9419 0.1983
-(1.30) (0.58) (2.17) -(4.68) -(0.63) (3.74) (1.24) -(1.55) (8.20) 0.9568
(5) TLL -0.5453 -0.4658 0.0424 -0.0081 -0.0134 0.0241 -0.0064 -0.0718 1.5653 0.2699
-(0.53) -(5.16) (1.77) -(1.05) -(1.75) (3.37) -(0.79) -(0.86) (6.48) 0.9564
dP/dx
(6) EMP -0.0493 -0.0005 0.0020 -0.0012 -0.0002 0.0010 0.0003 -0.0048 0.0718
(7) TAS -0.0509 0.0000 0.0020 -0.0013 -0.0002 0.0010 0.0004 -0.0052 0.0733
(8) SAL -0.0513 0.0000 0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0002 0.0010 0.0004 -0.0053 0.0733
(9) TDE -0.0499 0.0000 0.0020 -0.0013 -0.0002 0.0010 0.0004 -0.0050 0.0727
(10) TLL -0.0195 -0.0167 0.0015 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0026 0.0561
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Table 12 Estimation results multinomial logit model for number of bank relations:
Panel A: long-term loans 1982-1999 N=13888; R2=0.2016
Estimates
Constant TLL ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D MBD
(1) 2-4 1.2865 1.0124 0.0113 0.0031 -0.0051 -0.0108 0.0065 0.0421 0.3441
(2.20) (19.27) (1.24) (1.27) -(1.85) -(4.69) (2.58) (1.72) (4.98)
(2) 5-7 -0.6814 1.2865 0.0077 0.0175 -0.0147 -0.0188 0.0095 -0.0030 -0.5600
-(1.04) (24.49) (0.84) (6.80) -(5.13) -(7.61) (3.66) -(0.12) -(7.66)
(3) 8-10 -1.8875 1.4007 0.0412 0.0374 -0.0270 -0.0220 0.0028 0.0198 -1.5986
-(2.69) (26.60) (4.05) (13.24) -(8.76) -(7.98) (0.98) (0.70) -(18.61)
(4) 11-15 -5.5273 1.4809 0.0385 0.0407 -0.0208 -0.0169 0.0022 -0.0135 -2.3240
-(5.39) (28.09) (3.43) (12.96) -(6.20) -(5.54) (0.67) -(0.44) -(21.28)
(5) 16- -5.8936 1.5273 0.0542 0.0563 -0.0382 -0.0108 0.0098 0.0958 -3.1577
-(6.16) (28.93) (3.97) (13.17) -(9.31) -(2.59) (2.32) (2.67) -(15.73)
dP/dx
(1) single 0.0214 -0.0874 -0.0012 -0.0011 0.0009 0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0017 0.0310 0.0986
(2) 2-4 0.4089 -0.0039 -0.0009 -0.0027 0.0015 0.0006 0.0002 0.0059 0.1883 0.2431
(3) 5-7 0.1085 0.0328 -0.0031 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0009 0.0010 -0.0047 0.0572 0.2576
(4) 8-10 -0.0005 0.0284 0.0031 0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0869 0.1956
(5) 11-15 -0.4073 0.0225 0.0012 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0043 -0.1189 0.1424
(6) 16- -0.1311 0.0077 0.0010 0.0011 -0.0008 0.0003 0.0002 0.0039 -0.0707 0.0628
Panel B: Long-term loans 1982-1989 N=5262; R2=0.2343
Estimates
Constant TLL ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D MBD
(1) 2-4 -0.2896 1.2044 0.0167 0.0083 -0.0030 -0.0126 0.0090 0.0945 0.5248
-(0.67) (10.73) (1.02) (1.91) -(0.61) -(2.67) (2.20) (2.22) (4.53)
(2) 5-7 -1.4087 1.8161 -0.0057 0.0265 -0.0097 -0.0158 0.0101 0.0518 -0.4146
-(3.07) (16.18) -(0.32) (5.72) -(1.88) -(3.10) (2.37) (1.15) -(3.35)
(3) 8-10 -2.7287 2.0480 0.0212 0.0472 -0.0264 -0.0119 0.0110 0.0289 -1.5341
-(5.37) (18.15) (1.14) (9.15) -(4.69) -(2.07) (2.32) (0.58) -(10.57)
(4) 11-15 -5.1120 2.1661 0.0061 0.0509 -0.0166 -0.0158 -0.0033 -0.0035 -2.2850
-(8.11) (19.17) (0.29) (8.69) -(2.68) -(2.34) -(0.61) -(0.06) -(12.58)
(5) 16- -5.9451 2.2336 0.0230 0.0603 -0.0440 0.0044 0.0272 0.1275 -2.2957
-(7.44) (19.73) (0.84) (7.69) -(5.94) (0.49) (3.82) (1.99) -(8.73)
dP/dx
(1) single 0.0949 -0.1173 -0.0008 -0.0016 0.0007 0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0051 0.0152 0.1066
(2) 2-4 0.1962 -0.0289 0.0020 -0.0025 0.0012 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0091 0.1748 0.2286
(3) 5-7 0.1145 0.0527 -0.0036 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0009 0.0005 0.0008 0.0633 0.2605
(4) 8-10 -0.0308 0.0482 0.0024 0.0023 -0.0019 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0029 -0.0937 0.2033
(5) 11-15 -0.2630 0.0339 -0.0006 0.0014 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0061 -0.1253 0.1376
(6) 16- -0.1119 0.0113 0.0006 0.0008 -0.0011 0.0008 0.0009 0.0042 -0.0343 0.0633
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Table 12 (cont.)  Estimated results multinomial logit model for number of bank relations:
Panel C: Long-term loans 1990-1999 N=8535; R2=0.2085
Estimates
constant TLL ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D MBD
(1) 2-4 -0.0613 0.8585 0.0068 0.0001 -0.0060 -0.0103 0.0041 0.0179 0.1962
-(0.09) (14.50) (0.68) (0.03) -(1.78) -(3.81) (1.29) (0.60) (2.24)
(2) 5-7 -0.0255 1.1379 0.0185 0.0124 -0.0170 -0.0189 0.0096 -0.0489 -0.7482
-(0.04) (19.20) (1.76) (3.92) -(4.83) -(6.51) (2.90) -(1.50) -(8.00)
(3) 8-10 -0.0868 1.2354 0.0603 0.0327 -0.0282 -0.0252 0.0004 0.0023 -1.8300
-(0.12) (20.79) (4.92) (9.35) -(7.42) -(7.76) (0.11) (0.07) -(16.44)
(4) 11-15 -2.9337 1.3117 0.0623 0.0331 -0.0220 -0.0165 0.0060 -0.0394 -2.6027
-(2.80) (22.05) (4.56) (8.60) -(5.32) -(4.69) (1.46) -(1.05) -(18.23)
(5) 16- -2.8763 1.3597 0.0684 0.0484 -0.0343 -0.0169 -0.0001 0.0374 -4.2779
-(2.73) (22.82) (4.18) (9.08) -(6.62) -(3.47) -(0.02) (0.82) -(12.57)
dP/dx
(1) single 0.0188 -0.0734 -0.0015 -0.0008 0.0010 0.0011 -0.0004 0.0005 0.0403 0.0944
(2) 2-4 0.0499 -0.0080 -0.0033 -0.0025 0.0016 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0065 0.1922 0.2496
(3) 5-7 0.1182 0.0303 -0.0027 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0007 0.0012 -0.0091 0.0618 0.2579
(4) 8-10 0.1335 0.0241 0.0042 0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0008 0.0033 -0.0789 0.1913
(5) 11-15 -0.2553 0.0203 0.0025 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0036 -0.1133 0.1463
(6) 16- -0.0650 0.0066 0.0008 0.0009 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0025 -0.1022 0.0605




TLL ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D MBD
(1) 2-4 -0.0221 1.0661 0.0194 -0.0077 -0.0068 -0.0062 0.0072 -0.1178 0.5265
-(0.04) (8.29) (1.24) -(1.23) -(1.01) -(1.01) (1.16) -(1.94) (2.82)
(2) 5-7 -1.0721 1.2819 0.0430 0.0068 -0.0107 -0.0163 0.0155 -0.0753 -0.6915
-(1.84) (9.97) (2.68) (1.07) -(1.55) -(2.48) (2.46) -(1.19) -(3.49)
(3) 8-10 -1.6318 1.3580 0.0808 0.0225 -0.0263 -0.0310 0.0038 0.0039 -1.4914
-(2.55) (10.54) (4.33) (3.27) -(3.52) -(4.15) (0.54) (0.06) -(6.43)
(4) 11-15 -3.8632 1.4421 0.0981 0.0294 -0.0230 -0.0305 0.0077 -0.1891 -3.4556
-(4.91) (11.18) (4.78) (3.83) -(2.77) -(3.58) (0.95) -(2.29) -(9.01)
(5) 16- -4.0240 1.4952 0.0878 0.0410 -0.0283 -0.0163 -0.0116 -0.0796 -4.3722
-(4.41) (11.58) (3.65) (4.02) -(2.70) -(1.57) -(1.03) -(0.87) -(6.83)
dP/dx
(1) single 0.0534 -0.0810 -0.0027 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0009 -0.0006 0.0062 0.0244 0.0945
(2) 2-4 0.1737 0.0072 -0.0039 -0.0027 0.0009 0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0099 0.2202 0.2415
(3) 5-7 0.0467 0.0309 -0.0016 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0002 0.0020 0.0006 0.0614 0.2712
(4) 8-10 0.0042 0.0208 0.0040 0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0006 0.0152 -0.0233 0.1841
(5) 11-15 -0.2113 0.0157 0.0037 0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0011 0.0003 -0.0132 -0.1878 0.1405
(6) 16- -0.0667 0.0064 0.0005 0.0009 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0011 -0.0949 0.0683
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Table 12 (cont)  Estimated results multinomial logit model for number of bank relations:
Panel E: Short-term loans 1998-1999 N=2415; R2=0.1781
Estimates
constant TLL ROA DAR LAR CBR LLR R&D MBD
(1) 2-4 2.2735 -0.0223 -0.0562 0.0103 0.0086 -0.0235 0.0096 0.1174 -0.5162
(2.92) -(1.78) -(2.19) (1.25) (1.05) -(3.07) (1.13) (1.32) -(2.06)
(2) 5-7 2.0375 -0.0590 -0.0508 0.0475 0.0039 -0.0224 -0.0065 0.1130 -1.9129
(2.64) -(4.43) -(2.06) (5.83) (0.49) -(3.00) -(0.77) (1.27) -(7.73)
(3) 8-10 1.8062 -0.0216 -0.0647 0.0630 -0.0015 -0.0277 -0.0288 0.1582 -3.1692
(2.28) -(1.88) -(2.47) (7.44) -(0.19) -(3.56) -(3.26) (1.76) -(11.82)
(4) 11-15 0.7161 0.0244 -0.0680 0.0739 -0.0013 -0.0300 -0.0422 0.1838 -3.8865
(0.87) (2.16) -(2.50) (8.36) -(0.15) -(3.63) -(4.45) (1.99) -(12.39)
(5) 16- -2.2649 0.0535 -0.0416 0.1051 -0.0076 -0.0288 -0.0783 0.2652 -5.4165
-(2.23) (4.40) -(1.24) (9.63) -(0.73) -(2.85) -(6.08) (2.78) -(8.42)
dP/dx
(1) single -0.0689 0.0011 0.0020 -0.0014 -0.0002 0.0009 0.0003 -0.0047 0.0636 0.0418
(2) 2-4 0.0967 0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0048 0.0009 -0.0002 0.0033 -0.0008 0.2182 0.1830
(3) 5-7 0.1314 -0.0103 0.0013 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0006 0.0029 -0.0067 0.1072 0.2952
(4) 8-10 0.0942 -0.0008 -0.0018 0.0019 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0015 0.0025 -0.1204 0.2439
(5) 11-15 -0.0805 0.0060 -0.0017 0.0023 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0024 0.0044 -0.1531 0.1656
(6) 16- -0.1728 0.0031 0.0009 0.0021 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0024 0.0052 -0.1155 0.0704
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Table 13 Estimation results Tobit model for Herfindahl index
Panel A: Long-term loans 1982-1999
constant scale ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D MBD
(1) EMP 1.1579 0.0138 0.0062 0.0114 -0.0084 -0.0030 0.0001 0.0141 -0.6476
(3.27) (6.98) (4.71) (32.25) -(21.73) -(7.35) (0.28) (3.78) -(56.56)
(2) TAS 1.1694 0.0004 0.0061 0.0113 -0.0084 -0.0032 0.0001 0.0133 -0.6450
(3.31) (7.67) (4.68) (31.97) -(21.80) -(7.87) (0.21) (3.57) -(56.24)
(3) SAL 1.1648 0.0002 0.0062 0.0113 -0.0085 -0.0027 0.0001 0.0152 -0.6501
(3.29) (3.80) (4.74) (31.99) -(21.96) -(6.80) (0.22) (4.09) -(56.66)
(4) TDE 1.1871 0.0006 0.0061 0.0110 -0.0084 -0.0032 0.0001 0.0137 -0.6450
(3.36) (8.03) (4.66) (30.83) -(21.89) -(7.85) (0.16) (3.67) -(56.27)
(5) TLL 1.1635 0.0064 0.0061 0.0103 -0.0076 -0.0028 0.0002 0.0132 -0.6394
(3.32) (16.43) (4.71) (28.98) -(19.76) -(7.11) (0.52) (3.57) -(56.33)
Panel B: Long-term loans 1982-1989
constant scale ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D MBD
(1) EMP 1.3506 0.0104 0.0059 0.0147 -0.0102 0.0002 0.0018 0.0207 -0.5585
(7.02) (2.86) (2.37) (22.88) -(14.59) (0.21) (2.76) (3.21) -(29.85)
(2) TAS 1.3479 0.0002 0.0060 0.0147 -0.0103 0.0001 0.0017 0.0212 -0.5588
(7.00) (1.97) (2.39) (22.88) -(14.74) (0.17) (2.66) (3.27) -(29.80)
(3) SAL 1.3541 -0.0001 0.0062 0.0148 -0.0103 0.0007 0.0016 0.0230 -0.5631
(7.03) -(1.18) (2.47) (23.02) -(14.70) (0.78) (2.41) (3.57) -(30.06)
(4) TDE 1.3603 0.0003 0.0059 0.0145 -0.0103 0.0001 0.0017 0.0213 -0.5585
(7.07) (2.33) (2.38) (22.50) -(14.76) (0.14) (2.64) (3.30) -(29.81)
(5) TLL 1.3166 0.0045 0.0059 0.0140 -0.0097 0.0000 0.0017 0.0206 -0.5562
(6.88) (7.26) (2.36) (21.69) -(13.88) -(0.04) (2.66) (3.22) -(29.89)
Panel C: Long-term loans 1990-1999
constant scale ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D MBD
(1) EMP 1.2275 0.0150 0.0068 0.0098 -0.0077 -0.0037 -0.0006 0.0120 -0.7010
(3.50) (6.47) (4.40) (23.12) -(16.78) -(8.09) -(1.24) (2.65) -(48.74)
(2) TAS 1.2353 0.0004 0.0067 0.0097 -0.0077 -0.0040 -0.0006 0.0108 -0.6970
(3.53) (7.67) (4.37) (22.77) -(16.75) -(8.63) -(1.27) (2.37) -(48.40)
(3) SAL 1.2318 0.0003 0.0067 0.0096 -0.0078 -0.0036 -0.0005 0.0125 -0.7016
(3.51) (5.56) (4.32) (22.64) -(16.97) -(7.81) -(1.08) (2.75) -(48.72)
(4) TDE 1.2583 0.0007 0.0067 0.0093 -0.0077 -0.0040 -0.0007 0.0111 -0.6968
(3.60) (8.08) (4.35) (21.66) -(16.87) -(8.64) -(1.32) (2.45) -(48.42)
(5) TLL 1.2511 0.0076 0.0067 0.0085 -0.0068 -0.0034 -0.0004 0.0105 -0.6875
(3.61) (15.20) (4.43) (19.81) -(14.88) -(7.60) -(0.81) (2.35) -(48.30)
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Table 13 (cont.)  Estimation results Tobit model for Herfindahl index
Panel D: Long-term loans 1998-1999
constant scale ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D MBD
(1) EMP 1.3019 0.0183 0.0123 0.0094 -0.0073 -0.0042 -0.0019 -0.0045 -0.6781
(3.71) (4.23) (5.11) (11.51) -(8.40) -(4.22) -(2.05) -(0.50) -(23.12)
(2) TAS 1.3013 0.0005 0.0121 0.0091 -0.0071 -0.0046 -0.0018 -0.0062 -0.6745
(3.72) (5.37) (5.02) (11.17) -(8.15) -(4.61) -(1.91) -(0.68) -(23.05)
(3) SAL 1.2988 0.0004 0.0118 0.0090 -0.0073 -0.0042 -0.0016 -0.0046 -0.6761
(3.72) (5.65) (4.92) (11.10) -(8.41) -(4.25) -(1.73) -(0.50) -(23.16)
(4) TDE 1.3294 0.0008 0.0119 0.0087 -0.0072 -0.0046 -0.0019 -0.0053 -0.6748
(3.80) (5.38) (4.96) (10.52) -(8.21) -(4.60) -(2.00) -(0.59) -(23.07)
(5) TLL 1.3116 0.0042 0.0117 0.0083 -0.0066 -0.0037 -0.0017 -0.0043 -0.6715
(3.76) (6.38) (4.86) (10.02) -(7.50) -(3.77) -(1.81) -(0.48) -(23.02)
Panel E: Short-term loans 1998-1999
constant scale ROA DAR LAR CBR LLR R&D MBD
(1) EMP 1.2793 0.0156 -0.0015 0.0064 -0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0035 0.0039 -0.7674
(5.88) (5.55) -(0.80) (11.87) -(0.83) -(2.59) -(5.25) (0.84) -(39.49)
(2) TAS 1.2794 0.0003 -0.0016 0.0061 -0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0035 0.0017 -0.7594
(5.93) (8.28) -(0.86) (11.27) -(0.52) -(3.16) -(5.29) (0.36) -(39.33)
(3) SAL 1.2679 0.0003 -0.0017 0.0062 -0.0005 -0.0016 -0.0034 0.0034 -0.7659
(5.83) (5.81) -(0.91) (11.48) -(0.77) -(2.47) -(5.17) (0.73) -(39.42)
(4) TDE 1.2969 0.0004 -0.0014 0.0058 -0.0004 -0.0019 -0.0036 0.0030 -0.7610
(6.02) (8.42) -(0.80) (10.74) -(0.60) -(2.99) -(5.41) (0.66) -(39.47)
(5) TLL 1.2664 0.0053 -0.0004 0.0048 -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0031 0.0022 -0.7543
(5.97) (12.28) -(0.24) (8.72) -(0.20) -(2.34) -(4.79) (0.48) -(39.76)
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Appendix A - Additional Descriptive Tables
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Appendix A
Table A1. Number of sample firms by SNA industry classification and year
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 total
  (1) Agriculture, forestry and fishery 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 10
  (2) Mining 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 55
  (3) Manufacturing 576 595 626 657 672 678 703 736 761 785 783 782 792 834 846 893 967 958 13644
    1  Food and beverages 52 56 52 53 55 62 61 66 66 70 70 69 68 75 77 79 83 82 1196
    2  Textiles 23 25 35 42 41 45 42 44 45 50 52 54 53 55 58 52 56 56 828
    3  Pulp, paper and paper products 11 13 12 14 15 16 15 18 19 21 20 17 16 15 16 17 22 22 299
    4  Chemicals 66 67 69 78 83 78 85 86 98 92 91 96 94 97 96 106 123 120 1625
    5  Petroleum and coal products 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 4 2 3 9 6 45
    6  Non-metallic mineral products 33 30 34 35 35 32 35 37 39 40 39 38 40 43 43 44 45 47 689
    7  Basic metal 41 38 38 42 44 39 41 52 48 49 49 47 52 55 51 56 58 60 860
    8  Fabricated metal products 39 38 44 44 49 44 42 47 50 46 47 47 46 48 55 63 65 65 879
    9  Machinery 97 99 96 105 105 116 114 118 127 131 132 137 143 149 144 147 157 153 2270
    10  Elec. Machinery 85 89 95 97 98 96 102 110 107 116 115 109 112 113 110 114 123 128 1919
    11  Transport equipment 63 65 72 69 74 73 77 74 73 76 71 72 64 71 76 82 90 84 1326
    12  Precision instrument 18 22 21 23 20 22 23 22 23 22 24 26 27 27 30 29 28 28 435
    13  Others 46 50 56 53 51 54 65 59 65 71 73 69 75 82 88 101 108 107 1273
  (4) Construction 67 71 80 76 80 85 72 88 93 95 88 89 86 93 105 107 76 82 1533
  (5) Electricity, gas and water supply 6 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 7 8 86
  (6) Wholesale and retail trade 55 82 97 109 125 138 151 167 180 192 191 199 200 226 240 260 308 303 3223
  (8) Real estate 8 8 7 7 8 7 6 10 13 11 12 11 10 11 14 17 19 20 199
  (9) Trans. and communication 46 43 41 46 45 47 48 47 56 52 48 50 49 52 56 54 63 63 906
  (10) Services 20 35 34 35 35 43 46 49 55 60 59 65 70 76 84 95 109 114 1084
         total 779 840 890 935 971 1005 1030 1103 1167 1203 1191 1208 1217 1302 1356 1435 1554 1554 20740
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Table A2  Number of sample firms by debt financing pattern
T S L B M 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 total
(5) ❍ 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 11
(9) ❍ ❍ 88 95 104 98 94 92 88 91 87 83 88 92 97 113 130 143 178 197 1958
(12) ❍ ❍ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
  ❍                 
(15) ❍ ❍ 1 1
(18) ❍ ❍ ❍ 43 61 68 67 64 87 76 73 59 58 61 63 67 75 83 111 118 123 1357
 ❍  ❍     	  
  






(21) ❍ ❍ ❍ 14 27 36 54 68 75 112 128 145 150 150 151 158 165 160 150 137 105 1985
 ❍  ❍  
              	 	 	 
(24) ❍ ❍ ❍ 1 1 2 2 4 3 3 2 1 19
	 ❍  ❍ ❍         	       	   	
 ❍  ❍ ❍         	  
 






(28) ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ 13 17 27 37 54 57 74 95 110 109 108 96 93 92 105 96 81 82 1346
 ❍ ❍  ❍   
     
	       	  	 
	 	
 ❍ ❍  ❍ ❍ 
  
   
  	 	  
   
     

total 779 840 890 935 971 1005 1030 1103 1167 1203 1191 1208 1217 1302 1356 1435 1554 1554 20740
# of firms with long term loan 621 640 655 677 688 690 675 712 761 799 782 804 801 856 877 933 1038 1046 14055
firms using trade debt(%) 99.1 98.9 99.3 98.9 98.9 98.6 98.7 98.8 98.6 98.9 99.2 99.3 99.5 99.2 99.2 99.0 99.2 99.3 99.1
firms with short-term loan(%) 79.6 78.9 78.5 79.0 79.0 79.4 75.8 75.3 73.8 74.2 73.6 73.8 72.2 72.0 72.3 73.0 73.2 73.3 74.9
firms with long-term loan(%) 79.7 76.2 73.6 72.4 70.9 68.7 65.5 64.6 65.2 66.4 65.7 66.6 65.8 65.7 64.7 65.0 66.8 67.3 67.8
firms with corporate bond(%) 26.1 24.6 27.2 31.4 35.9 40.3 45.1 51.2 57.5 58.8 62.1 61.7 61.2 58.4 54.7 50.4 46.3 42.9 48.0
firms with misc. debt(%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table A3.  Selected financial indicators by year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(mean) ROA STP TBQ DAR IRR LAR LLR ICR GIR LND
1982 2.55 462 1.26 69.91 9.25 66.47 15.67 5.41 48.76 5.07
1983 1.89 482 1.29 69.48 8.11 64.93 15.76 4.28 42.95 5.60
1984 2.11 677 1.44 69.78 7.47 65.75 14.48 4.43 41.69 5.50
1985 2.30 773 1.54 69.66 7.43 65.41 13.40 4.62 46.16 5.69
1986 1.85 863 1.64 69.06 6.97 64.11 13.21 4.39 42.54 5.82
1987 1.83 1.014 1.82 68.84 5.83 63.68 13.18 4.90 40.92 6.08
1988 2.29 1.264 1.96 68.02 5.43 63.23 12.97 6.97 42.00 6.19
1989 2.89 1.446 2.08 67.28 6.33 63.52 11.88 6.77 48.25 6.26
1990 2.72 1.821 2.33 63.96 7.12 62.76 11.98 6.35 52.73 6.42
1991 2.30 1.599 1.99 63.87 8.95 60.97 12.92 5.79 55.07 6.59
1992 1.76 1.189 1.65 62.67 7.52 58.19 14.33 6.31 51.60 7.36
1993 0.72 824 1.34 62.13 5.79 56.19 15.95 5.95 39.11 8.03
1994 0.50 1.019 1.47 60.77 4.57 55.29 16.37 5.40 29.32 8.42
1995 0.68 1.003 1.44 60.62 4.03 55.65 15.69 7.21 27.00 8.74
1996 0.81 918 1.37 60.81 3.02 55.66 15.45 9.06 27.69 9.06
1997 0.96 1.268 1.38 60.13 2.51 55.20 15.10 12.58 31.77 9.50
1998 0.69 1.336 1.62 59.67 2.38 52.10 17.61 12.06 32.05 10.52
1999 -0.43 1.284 1.12 59.78 2.18 51.39 19.63 11.82 26.42 10.99
total 1.46 1.095 1.58 64.23 5.54 59.29 14.96 7.28 39.41 7.60
(median)
1982 2.15 302 1.17 71.47 7.84 68.60 11.51 3.04 42.03 3.76
1983 1.98 287 1.16 70.90 7.50 67.31 10.79 2.89 34.98 4.05
1984 1.93 371 1.26 71.31 7.03 68.76 9.59 2.84 34.66 4.06
1985 2.00 435 1.35 70.61 6.72 68.49 8.76 2.98 38.33 4.13
1986 1.71 538 1.48 69.97 6.38 67.03 8.70 2.78 36.43 4.26
1987 1.74 652 1.59 69.59 5.25 66.27 8.79 3.19 33.15 4.28
1988 2.19 838 1.71 69.49 4.57 65.26 8.66 4.10 34.29 4.69
1989 2.45 1.013 1.88 68.29 4.67 65.81 7.71 4.52 42.69 4.71
1990 2.32 1.310 2.07 65.46 5.68 65.33 8.18 4.08 47.87 4.69
1991 2.15 1.110 1.78 64.76 7.83 61.69 9.07 3.37 47.99 4.84
1992 1.68 890 1.52 63.50 7.29 58.87 10.13 3.14 43.32 5.54
1993 1.00 595 1.26 63.39 5.48 56.75 12.23 2.80 29.05 6.19
1994 0.90 695 1.37 61.51 4.33 56.09 12.41 2.77 20.52 6.49
1995 1.05 708 1.34 61.34 3.72 57.16 11.56 3.25 20.25 6.67
1996 1.19 660 1.27 60.71 2.71 56.85 10.79 4.06 21.34 7.04
1997 1.28 663 1.27 59.88 2.11 56.93 10.18 5.36 24.52 7.56
1998 1.02 439 1.07 59.67 2.00 53.29 13.35 4.97 25.59 8.40
1999 0.71 357 1.00 58.76 1.96 52.99 16.19 4.18 20.53 8.74
total 1.55 655 1.37 65.09 4.90 61.29 10.58 3.47 31.16 5.59
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Table A4.  Selected financial indicators by industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(mean) ROA STP TBQ DAR IRR LAR LLR ICR GIR LND
(1) Agriculture, forestry and fishery 4.92 2.195 1.93 54.43 2.28 51.22 23.66 16.13 45.37 12.66
(2) Mining 2.52 776 1.84 47.08 4.96 56.69 20.35 12.25 32.60 6.55
(3) Manufacturing 1.38 898 1.61 63.38 5.80 61.48 14.05 6.69 40.87 6.26
1  Food and beverages 2.15 1.003 1.61 59.08 6.58 53.56 14.65 11.06 38.03 9.18
2  Textiles 0.25 565 1.58 70.75 5.61 59.88 17.22 3.83 37.38 6.21
3  Pulp, paper and paper products 0.95 689 1.36 67.22 5.55 52.82 22.64 4.72 35.97 7.65
4  Chemicals 1.89 881 1.66 60.72 7.03 58.71 14.55 8.43 42.53 6.78
5  Petroleum and coal products 0.98 601 1.41 79.23 5.65 60.87 21.71 2.59 35.84 7.94
6  Non-metallic mineral products 1.54 859 1.54 64.80 5.41 61.53 16.73 5.70 45.37 6.63
7  Basic metal 0.97 631 1.51 66.23 5.63 59.18 15.82 3.96 41.01 5.63
8  Fabricated metal products 1.81 739 1.40 67.10 4.86 62.75 11.74 6.65 38.90 8.28
9  Machinery 1.26 813 1.88 61.26 5.35 68.18 12.91 7.59 37.09 5.22
10  Electrical machinery 0.93 1.339 1.67 61.56 6.16 66.92 12.04 6.22 45.68 4.06
11  Transport equipment 1.54 734 1.39 66.63 5.90 56.78 13.08 5.65 43.07 5.18
12  Precision instrument 0.79 812 1.64 63.17 5.65 68.29 13.37 1.56 38.54 4.29
13  Others 1.79 1.245 1.55 60.19 5.22 59.67 12.29 8.43 42.30 8.13
(4) Construction 1.56 971 1.33 76.72 3.57 79.45 6.61 8.59 37.47 5.74
(5) Electricity, gas and water 3.08 551 1.24 69.02 5.45 16.95 40.58 6.53 41.39 9.94
(6) Wholesale and retail trade 1.50 1.259 1.44 63.46 5.57 56.19 13.65 7.42 38.58 10.15
(8) Real estate 1.71 1.164 1.54 68.18 4.40 46.27 27.38 7.31 32.71 19.50
(9) Trans. and communication 1.56 1.255 1.64 68.24 5.38 36.49 30.52 7.13 32.15 13.67
(10) Services 2.09 3.941 2.10 54.61 4.75 39.19 20.92 14.36 32.25 13.72
total 1.46 1.095 1.58 64.23 5.54 59.29 14.96 7.28 39.41 7.60
non manufacturing 1.65 1.512 1.54 66.03 4.96 54.66 16.88 8.53 36.30 10.45
(median)
(1) Agriculture, forestry and fishery 6.86 2.720 2.14 43.74 2.37 38.97 27.23 19.77 37.76 17.37
(2) Mining 2.60 708 1.78 42.17 4.41 56.25 19.03 7.10 28.88 4.26
(3) Manufacturing 1.56 606 1.39 63.97 5.12 62.21 10.63 3.35 33.30 5.03
1  Food and beverages 2.01 673 1.45 59.48 5.57 53.58 10.03 4.50 29.40 6.75
2  Textiles 0.80 418 1.36 72.21 5.18 59.05 15.50 1.99 26.61 4.47
3  Pulp, paper and paper products 1.40 575 1.28 71.87 5.26 54.24 21.04 2.74 27.46 6.80
4  Chemicals 1.82 681 1.45 59.95 5.28 58.71 10.12 4.07 37.00 5.91
5  Petroleum and coal products 0.62 419 1.32 82.25 4.31 66.75 20.50 2.18 27.80 4.56
6  Non-metallic mineral products 1.41 573 1.39 66.36 5.23 62.09 14.60 2.91 34.46 5.10
7  Basic metal 1.17 519 1.37 67.89 5.29 60.11 13.59 2.68 32.43 4.85
8  Fabricated metal products 1.68 538 1.25 68.53 4.24 63.62 8.45 3.78 30.48 7.46
9  Machinery 1.52 576 1.43 62.09 4.71 69.36 8.76 3.20 28.72 4.15
10  Electrical machinery 1.64 770 1.53 61.61 5.34 69.13 8.42 3.43 38.08 2.84
11  Transport equipment 1.52 569 1.26 66.81 5.32 56.13 10.74 3.38 38.75 4.86
12  Precision instrument 1.50 655 1.49 59.81 5.28 69.10 11.80 3.55 31.31 3.48
13  Others 1.89 715 1.37 58.76 4.91 60.93 9.26 4.35 34.56 6.77
(4) Construction 1.25 734 1.23 80.23 3.09 81.41 4.55 4.06 27.85 4.51
(5) Electricity, gas and water 2.24 417 1.18 75.45 5.23 15.60 39.49 3.74 38.98 9.93
(6) Wholesale and retail trade 1.51 906 1.26 63.85 4.75 57.93 8.71 3.69 26.92 7.76
(8) Real estate 1.73 750 1.27 71.54 4.07 40.81 23.79 3.72 15.30 19.56
(9) Trans. and communication 1.55 596 1.42 70.79 5.45 34.04 27.43 2.89 26.28 12.36
(10) Services 2.03 1.155 1.64 56.75 4.33 38.58 19.58 4.49 20.63 11.70
total 1.55 655 1.37 65.09 4.90 61.29 10.58 3.47 31.16 5.59
non manufacturing 1.54 802 1.31 67.85 4.36 55.70 10.47 3.73 26.78 7.65
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Table A5. Stock ownership structure by year (%)



























1982 0.15 24.52 1.07 31.57 3.33 39.35 100 19.78 32.21 49.77
1983 0.13 24.53 1.16 32.78 3.37 38.04 100 20.07 32.43 49.94
1984 0.12 25.07 1.51 32.55 3.78 36.97 100 19.78 32.11 49.74
1985 0.11 25.23 1.86 33.03 3.71 36.07 100 19.63 32.00 49.81
1986 0.09 26.01 2.17 33.60 3.39 34.74 100 19.65 32.34 50.58
1987 0.08 26.60 2.29 34.37 2.77 33.90 100 20.00 32.51 50.81
1988 0.10 26.45 2.67 35.28 2.64 32.86 100 20.52 33.16 51.37
1989 0.07 27.84 2.56 34.96 2.62 31.95 100 19.83 32.13 50.68
1990 0.07 29.32 2.17 35.49 2.84 30.11 100 19.94 32.02 50.77
1991 0.06 30.02 1.76 35.53 2.69 29.94 100 19.83 31.95 50.95
1992 0.10 29.96 1.64 35.48 2.94 29.89 100 19.63 31.38 50.16
1993 0.09 29.59 1.21 35.31 2.85 30.95 100 19.73 31.53 50.12
1994 0.07 29.19 1.28 34.60 3.58 31.28 100 19.91 31.69 50.13
1995 0.07 29.03 1.25 33.89 4.01 31.75 100 19.85 31.76 50.08
1996 0.05 27.83 1.81 34.02 4.08 32.21 100 19.96 31.91 50.16
1997 0.05 27.11 1.30 33.51 4.15 33.88 100 20.06 32.12 50.23
1998 0.08 26.01 0.89 33.14 4.05 35.85 100 20.16 32.28 50.23
1999 0.08 25.14 0.79 32.87 3.70 37.43 100 20.15 32.21 49.99
total 0.08 27.26 1.59 34.00 3.40 33.67 100 19.93 32.08 50.30
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Appendix B Yearly details on the number of bank relations
Table B.1 Number of bank relations with respect to long-term loans by year
Table B.2 Number of bank relations with respect to short-term loans by year
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Table B1  Number of bank relations with respect to long-term loans by year
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 total
0 158 200 235 258 283 315 355 391 406 404 409 404 416 446 479 502 516 508 6685
1 49 59 59 66 70 82 86 90 96 93 69 62 69 65 69 94 103 89 1370
2 48 39 50 50 41 48 55 54 73 72 65 68 65 68 82 95 76 85 1134
3 41 51 54 49 54 47 37 60 57 65 60 67 55 67 60 79 89 75 1067
4 53 50 50 59 60 54 57 58 57 54 67 72 69 78 78 86 89 84 1175
5 50 61 63 60 76 65 71 78 70 76 72 66 70 75 75 84 97 95 1304
6 59 59 53 56 59 65 58 55 51 60 66 60 77 82 83 83 96 98 1220
7 53 56 43 44 53 49 55 51 68 66 66 61 60 65 72 69 79 93 1103
8 59 50 53 58 49 52 57 53 55 60 49 57 55 61 70 67 66 67 1038
9 26 40 57 56 58 53 43 59 63 59 66 61 52 53 57 58 68 72 1001
10 32 36 38 30 31 35 26 34 35 40 41 47 33 43 43 43 53 56 696
11 22 29 30 35 23 22 20 21 22 30 35 36 47 43 44 45 40 44 588
12 27 24 23 24 23 28 26 24 27 24 28 31 30 36 30 26 44 50 525
13 20 17 9 15 17 23 22 21 18 19 16 19 23 23 27 27 23 20 359
14 18 8 15 18 13 15 11 10 14 18 23 22 26 23 19 16 21 23 313
15 17 12 10 14 13 8 9 9 13 12 9 18 16 18 14 12 10 20 234
16 14 13 12 14 13 12 11 8 8 10 18 17 19 20 16 11 23 16 255
17 9 7 11 3 7 9 11 8 13 10 8 10 8 5 8 11 15 11 164
18 6 8 2 3 5 7 6 3 6 5 6 8 4 7 5 10 9 10 110
19 3 5 9 10 6 3 2 4 2 5 5 7 5 9 10 5 9 11 110
20 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 4 1 5 2 1 4 7 8 53
21 4 4 3 1 4 2 1 2 2 1 5 5 3 4 3 4 4 52
22 2 2 3 3 3 4 3 2 1 5 2 4 1 1 1 4 3 44
23 2 2 3 1 2 2 4 2 2 3 5 5 3 5 3 44
24 2 1 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 3 4 22
25 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 10
26 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 14
27 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 8
28 1 1 1 3
29 1 1 1 1 1 5
30 1 1 2
31 2 1 1 1 5
32 1 1 1 3
34 1 1 2
35 2 1 3
36 1 1 1 1 1 5
37 1 1 1 1 4





52 1 1 2
55 1 1
total 779 840 890 935 971 1005 1030 1103 1167 1203 1191 1208 1217 1302 1356 1435 1554 1554 20740
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Table B2. Number of bank relations
with respect to short-term loans by year
1998 1999 total




2 47 49 96
3 77 71 148
4 98 100 198
5 105 120 225
6 114 126 240
7 126 122 248
8 127 112 239
9 91 106 197
10 78 75 153
11 59 65 124
12 59 47 106
13 38 43 81
14 31 21 52
15 16 21 37
16 15 7 22
17 13 19 32
18 10 8 18
19 7 7 14
20 9 9 18
21 8 2 10
22 6 5 11
23 2 4 6
24 2 3 5
25 1 2 3
26 3 1 4
27 1 3 4
28 1 4 5
29 2 1 3
30 1 1
31 2 1 3







total 1685 1687 3372
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Figure3. Herfindahl index for long-term loans
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